With the new data of the commercial train videos submitted to the Court, the National Organization for the Investigation of Air and Railway Accidents and Transport Safety (EODASAAM) is expected to publish its findings on February 27, which will concern the causes of the Tempi accident, although it will also dissect what has changed in the Greek railway two years after the tragedy. The findings, which are presented in detail by "THEMA", will not be particularly pleasant for anyone concerned. Of course, it will not only concern the large fire that occurred after the collision of the passenger train with the commercial train late at night on February 28, 2023, but will also evaluate what happened and led to this tragedy.
It took a long time to complete the Organization's report, which is expected to be a trigger for broader developments. The head of the Organization's railway branch, experienced lawyer Christos Papadimitriou, collaborated with executives of the European Railway Agency (ERA) who came to our country, following communication between the government and the Commission, in order to investigate what went wrong that night, but also before the collision, and of course to highlight what needs to be changed in the Greek railways. As a general conclusion of the report, we could say the following: everything went wrong and everything needs to change, as so far the steps to adapt have been few.
For several months, Mr. Papadimitriou, together with Bart Akou, the No. 2 of ERA, and his task force visited the sites of the tragedy: the Larissa railway station, the controversial station building, the site of the tragedy in Tempi, the Thessaloniki freight station, etc. They spoke with over 80 people and only one refused to speak to them: the undertrial station master Vasilis Samaras, who was recently released from prison awaiting trial, as his period of pretrial detention had ended. The EODASAAM report describes what went wrong that night, what was going wrong until then, what has changed or what has not changed since then, and makes recommendations to OSE, Hellenic Train, the Railway Regulatory Authority, the Commission and ERA, as well as to the Ministry of Transport itself, which is its leading authority.
The fatal mistakes
"The tragic and unacceptable thing about the case is that the two trains entered the same line," a competent source tells "THEMA", also commenting on the latest developments regarding the cargo of the commercial train that caught fire after the collision and, apparently, caused deaths.
The executives of the Organization return to the fateful night for the country, in the middle of the three-day period of Clean Monday, where the inexperienced and essentially untrained stationmaster Vasilis Samaras is left alone in the stationhouse, while according to standard practice there are two stationmasters on the shift. The report dissects the stationmaster's movements throughout the previous days and assesses his training as inadequate. In fact, other witnesses describe the Larissa station as the third most difficult to manage, after those in Athens and Thessaloniki. And while night shifts tend to be more "relaxed", that night's shift turns into a nightmare. Based on the report, Samaras appears distraught. He has to deal with train delays and protesting passengers, who open the station door and talk to him.
90 communications in one hour
It is indicative that within one hour he makes 90 communications via the radio, which is not usual. He makes a mistake and puts the local Larissa Suburban, train 2597, on the wrong line, until the train driver realizes it. The intercoms increase the anxiety of the inexperienced stationmaster, who has commonly "lost the ball". In fact, as the stationmaster is structured, he has the keys on his back and he himself makes communications with the radio looking ahead. As a result, he does not turn the keys and the passenger train enters the wrong line.
The experts also found various violations of protocol here, resulting in the two trains moving on the same line for 5,5 kilometers.
The experienced train driver of the passenger train, Giorgos Koutsoubas, who has also made the downward route from Thessaloniki and has been delayed, is trying to buy time. He has adventures with his health as he has suffered a stroke, but this does not prevent him from driving. He is considered experienced, but authoritarian. He leaves the Larissa station without receiving the so-called "telegram 1001", that is, that he is going in the opposite direction. And he himself does not repeat word for word the message that he hears from the stationmaster Samaras on the radio. However, even when he reaches the "key" and essentially enters the opposite line, he does not communicate with the stationmaster. The rest is history.
The load and the videos
In the last two months, ERA experts have been thoroughly investigating the explosion that caused the large fireball. According to information, the Europeans had shown the videos to several experts without receiving a convincing answer. What the experts who compiled the report certainly did not take into account were the new videos submitted to the appeal investigator by lawyer Vasilis Kapernaros, which depict the course of the commercial train, based on which no tank that could contain solvents appears on the first platforms after the engine. The authenticity of the videos will be checked, although competent sources believe that it is unlikely that falsified videos were submitted at this stage. In any case, according to information, EODASAAM will request to receive the material that the investigator has in his hands, even before the completion of the assessment of their authenticity. And it remains to be seen whether this process can affect the timing of the publication of the report - even if this does not exclusively concern the fire.
Until the videos appear, however, the University of Pisa advises that the Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) method could be used to draw conclusions. The University of Ghent is then assigned to define the parameters of the model. Based on sampling from the scene of the tragedy several days after the accident and with the videos of the collision available, the conclusion that the scientists are led to is that this explosion seems unlikely to have resulted from silicone oils, as the Fire Department states in its report. Based on research by the Rice Institute in Stockholm, for the silicone oils to have caused this fire, the transformers would have had to have been heated to 400°C and the transformers would have been damaged or have deep cracks. Scientists estimate that the material that was heated reached 200°-250°C and the transformers are intact. All these findings lead to the conclusion of aromatic hydrocarbons.
Instructions
According to the report, it is obvious that if the famous 717 contract had been completed and there had been an automatic braking system on the trains, the accident would not have happened. However, the authors of the report do not go into further details regarding the non-execution of the contract in question, as this was not the question they were asked to answer.
Most importantly, however, the findings point to the conclusion that two years later, very little has changed to correct the structural gaps in the Greek railways. And with this in mind, EDOASAAM is issuing a series of fiery directives to the organizations involved.
For Hellenic Train, which has not assumed any responsibility so far, it is emphasized that it should develop a system to record and process intercoms, something it has not done to date. It is called upon to apply disciplinary sanctions, unlike today, but also to develop a system to control the loading of wagons, as even today this does not exist. For OSE, things are even worse. It is described as an extremely understaffed organization with almost 2.200 (2.184) positions in its organizational chart, of which 589 are covered. In practice, OSE operates at 25% of its appropriate capacity. It is called upon to better understand the risks associated with its operation by carrying out systematic maintenance and not repairs to its infrastructure. It is called upon to create a long-term plan for the safety and renewal of the line, as well as a manual for the supervision of those who have a role in railway safety. At the same time, it is called upon to develop a more specific evaluation and training system for those who have critical tasks, such as stationmasters and keymen. It is also found that the stationmasters are structured incorrectly, with the board on the back of the stationmasters, while it is considered wrong to have a limit of 160 km/h throughout the network when the condition of the line is not taken into account. “In Germany, in points without remote control, the maximum speed limit is 80 km/h,” it is characteristically stated.
GSMR Urgently
For OSE, however, the EDOASAAM's remarks are of an urgent nature. More specifically, in June, the Organization called on OSE to immediately develop a GSMR system so that trains can communicate directly with each other. On the part of OSE, there was a commitment that by December the system would be developed and operational. It is now February and it does not seem that the system will be operational immediately and in any case within the first quarter of 2025, as GAIOSE sources reported some time ago.
As for the Railway Regulatory Authority, the report states that it must create a system to monitor all critical safety incidents first and then evaluate them and issue recommendations. It must also conduct more inspections and audits. Of course, everyone recognizes that the RAS is understaffed. The Ministry of Transport is urgently called upon to manage the staffing issues of both the RAS and the OSE.
The warnings, at the same time, are also addressed to Europe, with recommendations to the Commission and the ERA to strengthen the supervision of OSE and RAS respectively, as it is obvious that the European control framework has also been particularly lax and allowed the mismanagement of funds associated with the implementation of critical infrastructure in the security sector.
Source: protothema.gr
