By Nikos Moudouros *
The violent diversification of the Cypriot geographical area caused by the invasion of Turkey in 1974 caused many negative consequences. Among them was the coercion into new ideological concepts and perceptions for the description of the landscape, which previously could not exist or if they existed had a different content.
The fragmentation of the territory and the population built the basis on which the political vocabulary of the Cyprus problem was necessarily expanded.
On one side of the dividing line are the occupied territories, which are not controlled by the Republic of Cyprus. On the other hand, are the free areas.
Even the above description is compelled to include the reference to "two sides", which as such, that is, as two separate entities in space, could not be reflected in public political discourse before 1974. At least they could not be reflected in scope, the intensity and content they acquired after 1974.
This development was not accidental. As in other cases of foreign military intervention, so in the Cypriot case, the war of 1974 caused the violent transformation of the area. At the same time, he brought with him new terminology and concepts that have worked since then to describe (critically or not) the dichotomous state of affairs. One of the concepts that was of course not unknown in the pre-1974 period but later acquired a more intense ideological content, is the concept of the roadblock.
If, however, this notion in the Greek Cypriot community expressed a relative unanimity in describing a pending and unacceptable situation, in the Turkish Cypriot community the ideological recruits around the roadblock were complex. It could even be said that given the intense experience of roadblocks from 1964 onwards, for the Turkish Cypriot community this concept produced ideological polarizations and political controversies, which in one way or another continue to this day.
Nationalist "border" readings
It is a fact that for several years after the invasion of 1974, the ideological power of division as a political position, but also of geographical fragmentation as a reality of the war, helped the attempt of the then Turkish Cypriot nationalist elite to impose its hegemony.
In the ideological background created in the summer of 1974, the roadblock that separated the island became almost immediately one of the most important symbols of a separate Turkish Cypriot rule. It became a political tool for proving the successful completion of the political program of division, the sole actor of which was Denktash and the circles of power he created.
Explaining the value of the "Peace Operation" for the Turkish Cypriot community through the nationalist context, Oguz Korhan, a leading member of the National Unity Party, said in a "Parliament" session: "But the most important thing was that we experienced the joy of security a secure territorial integrity with clearly defined borders ". In this space - the space defined by the invasion - there was no free field of activity for those forces that were not part of the aforementioned ideological fantasy.
But beyond that, for the Turkish Cypriot nationalist elite, the "clearly defined borders" were the emblematic proof of the existence of a separate and independent people, a separate state and therefore the impossibility of Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots living together in a united political space.
In this way, the "borders" in the program of the Turkish Cypriot right was a dynamic concept. It was the result of specific political, ideological and socio-economic processes. It was a necessary condition for the social and territorial division of Cyprus. Just as a state seeks to concretize its territory, politically demarcate its borders, and nationally homogenize society, so an illegitimate state or regime of exclusion can pursue the same goals (perhaps with more external interventions). There are "self-affirmation" procedures in both cases.
In the case of Cyprus, the separate power structures created by Ankara and the Denktash leadership after 1974, the "border" were such a self-affirmation. It was a practical proof of "state sovereignty". It was a fetish of power and reproduction of the idea of the existence of the "TRNC" as a controlling force of society.
Denktash's "border" was at the same time an integral and integral part of the landscape in which he developed the idea and form of "governability" that still exists today. For the ideological framework expressed for decades by the former Turkish Cypriot leader, the "border", the "border" and the "roadblock" were functions that could even in everyday speech emphasize the "inside" and the "outside", "we And "others". So these concepts in their practical aspect were above all political and social acts.
How they saw the first opening
The front-page headlines of the newspapers supporting the federal settlement of the Cyprus issue were characteristic of the opposition ideological envelope of opening the roadblocks.
"Africa" on April 23, 2003 is released with the title "All Cyprus is yours". He even notes that "29 years later, our" people "are meeting today with the other half of their homeland."
The newspaper "Yeni Duzen" on April 22, 2003 was published with the front page headline "The status quo will collapse". Its front page was supplemented with the following report: "We approached the situation before 1974; but then there were no time constraints either. Those who think that the Turkish Cypriot "people" are a "toy" have opened the roadblocks at the moment!… But the Turkish Cypriots want more, they ask for much more. "Apart from taking a 'walk', the Turkish Cypriots are waiting for the day when they will have an identity all over the world."
The newspaper "Kipris" noted: "Historic day. For the first time in 29 years! "
In this way, the first opening of the roadblocks caused a flashback. A past that, as the opposition put it, was not characterized mainly by roadblocks and secession.
The aforementioned political reports in the newspapers referred to a time when there was no "other side", at least to the hostile background imposed by the Denktash government. The constant reference to the period before the closure of the roadblocks was a direct opposition to the way in which the issue of the coexistence of the two communities was presented by the Turkish Cypriot nationalist elite. The communities coexisted and so they can do it again, was the underground statement. Therefore, the opening of the roadblocks in 2003, among many others, was a dynamic act that reminded a large part of the Turkish Cypriot community of the "current situation", the "exceptional and abnormal" situation in which it lived. In short, a large part of the Turkish Cypriots were, once again, confronted with the situation of the interval between the illegal regime and the legal situation that the solution of the Cyprus problem would create.
Left quests to "break the 'borders'"
If the act of constructing a "border" separating the two communities was a political necessity for the Turkish Cypriot right, for the left it had a completely different recruiter. After all, the multidimensional nature of borders and roadblocks can only leave open the prospects for different interpretations of their role and content. As in many other cases in the Turkish Cypriot, the roadblocks after 1974 were "conflict constructions". They produced different political positions in relation to the state of "open", "closed", "mild" or "hard roadblock".
Even though for many decades the closed roadblocks of the "TRNC" functioned as self-affirmations of a separate state sovereignty, they were at the same time dynamics of overthrowing the founding ideology of division. On the one hand, at the level of geography, the closed roadblocks may have clearly shown the scope of power of the "TRNC". On the other hand, and contradictory, the boundaries of this power were not at all clear. For the Turkish Cypriot left and then for the wider political forces of the community, the closed roadblock was the emblematic way of expressing their exile and exclusion. It was the daily confirmation of their isolation, but also of the alienation of their Cypriot identity.
Over the years, the geographical "border" imposed by Ankara acquired such characteristics that the Turkish Cypriot opposition eventually described the "TRNC" as an "open prison". The ongoing political and economic crises, the tight embrace of the Turkish military establishment and the repression combined with years of international isolation and one-way economic integration in Turkey, have created the conditions for claiming "contact with the outside world".
In September 2001, the head of the Turkish Cypriot secondary school teachers' union, Ahmet Barcin, told reporters in the international press: "Tell the whole world that the TRNC is an open prison. It is a large militarized zone and all the doors are locked. The only key to our freedom is a short-term solution with the Greek Cypriot side, EU membership. and our integration with the rest of the world. "
Conditions of oppression
As early as the 1990s, the Turkish Cypriot opposition was able to express these new demands and perceptions shaped by the community's "contact" with the "outside world" and its implications. This contact was in many cases metaphorical, but deeply political. International property court rulings, the Republic of Cyprus accession process to the EU, rulings and measures of commercial exclusion of products bearing the stamp of the pseudo-state and much more were a kind of contact of the Turkish Cypriots with the "other side" of the roadblock, which eventually contributed to the intensification of awareness of their own confinement. Through the "outside" the Turkish Cypriots were better aware of the conditions of oppression that prevailed in their own "inside".
"I want my homeland back"
The political, economic and cultural alienation created by the closed roadblocks was typically expressed in the slogan of the January 2003 mobilizations: "I want my homeland back." On the basis of the politicization of this emotional state, the decision for unilateral opening of the roadblocks, taken in April 2003, was accepted on the condition of further massification of the movement in favor of the solution of the Cyprus problem.
The current "gray" situation
As mentioned above, the creation and opening of the roadblock involves many social and political dynamics. It is determined by external and internal developments, while it is stigmatized by those forces that will undertake either its creation or its opening and lifting. The current situation with the opening of roadblocks therefore bears the characteristics of the recent past. But at the same time, the changes recorded from 2003 until today, which are mainly accompanied by the reproduction of the failure of a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem, should not be underestimated.
Regarding the Turkish Cypriot community in particular, the opening of roadblocks today is not just a matter of the forces supporting the overall federal solution to the problem. The new element emerges from the wider strengthening of the political position on "normalization", which is mainly based on promoting the perception that federation is no longer possible.
In the context of the forces currently promoting a two-state solution or a two-state confederation, the opening of roadblocks is an act of normalization and reduction of tension, but it is also a political measure to "normalize" the existence of two separate states that may reach an agreement.
A typical example is Zorlou Torre, a "member" of the National Unity Party and one of the exponents of the Turkish Cypriot far right. Commenting on the opening of the roadblocks of Aplikio and Deryneia, he noted: "At the moment when neither the united Cyprus nor the federation is possible, the opening of roadblocks that serve even partially to build trust, is in the interest of both" peoples ". . "Border roadblocks are the clearest expression of the transition from one state to another and are the basis of a two-state solution."
It is a fact that the ideology of the border of separation can be expressed whether it is closed or open. Over time and without being accompanied by an effort to fully resolve the Cyprus problem, "piece-by-piece" solutions can contribute to the development of trust, but at the same time they can consolidate the territorial-political reality of division. The gradual liberalization of trafficking, if permanently cut off from the holistic solution, is capable of adding to the sense of "peaceful but separate coexistence".
* Dr. of Turkish Studies