They mine Ammohosto in the shadow of the two states

Snapshot 2018 07 22 18.21.11 Famagusta, Yannos Charalambidis, Cyprus, Nea Famagusta, Deryneia Roadblock

By Dr. Giannos Charalambidis

The Turks are proceeding step by step on the basis of planning and blackmail on the issue of Famagusta, and today they connect it with the acquis of the talks and the opening of the Deryneia Barrier, for which decisions were made without the necessary planning and study. The event provokes reactions from residents and organized Professional Organizations of the free area of ​​Famagusta. Besides, the whole Turkish plan is related to what Mevlüt Çavuşo προςlu had said to the Turkish Cypriot leadership during his recent visit to Cyprus on April 20, 2018. He pointed out to his interlocutors that the Cyprus issue is now moving towards a solution between the "two states". ». What was said is known to the Government and at least to some of the political leaders.

Turkish design and law

The above are emphasized for two main reasons: First, the new UN envoy Jane Hall Luth will start her contacts tomorrow, Monday, and, second, there are no indications of a change in the Turkish attitude. On the contrary, the Turks are implementing their plans, either inside or outside the talks, in the form of a form of division, based on the two states, whether they are constituent or not, with the Government and the National Council having no comprehensive alternative. strategy and plan B.

The plan for Famagusta had already been drawn up and appears together with the Turkish drill of the "Conqueror", as another Damocles sword at the head of the Republic of Cyprus. The Turks, when they deem the conditions suitable, will invite the Greek Cypriot owners of the besieged city of Famagusta to return to exploit their property on the basis of a program of reconstruction and tourist exploitation, as well as commercial development, but under the administration of .

In essence, they seek the recognition of the occupation regime through the Greek Cypriots, who will pay taxes and will be subject to the courts and the "authorities" of the pseudo-state, which are characterized as invalid by Security Council Resolutions 541 and 550. Not applicable. At the same time, the EU in a statement of 21 September 2005, responding to Ankara - which had stated before the accession process that it did not recognize the Republic of Cyprus - stated:

1. On the island of Cyprus it recognizes as the only state, that of the Republic of Cyprus.

2. Turkey must, in the context of its accession processes, normalize its relations with the Republic of Cyprus and recognize it.
Related to the above are the decisions of the Fourth Transnational Appeal and Titina Loizidou, which characterize any Turkish Cypriot administration in the north as a vassal in Turkey due to the illegal presence of Attila.

The theoretical and practical background of these principles of International Law lies in the state of Matsukuo. This is the case when, in the interwar period, the Japanese invaded Manchuria and the League of Nations designated Matsukuo state as a puppet state, as it arose from violence and the use of weapons. This principle is enshrined in Article 1 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations.

The use of the acquis of conversations

Of course, one can argue that recognition can only come through states. But when a people begins to accept and carry out acts of quasi-recognition, there comes the deterioration and gradual legitimation of the occupation and the separate state, as long as the citizen of the rule of law accepts the illegitimate Authorities and becomes subject to them.

It is true that the above, ie the issues of International Law and the legal and political framework, remained by the Cypriot party system as tools of internal consumption and not as a clear basis for resolving the Cyprus issue, as Turkey's obligation to recognize the Republic of Cyprus, We have reached a solution on the basis of which the current pseudo-state will be recognized by us as an equal Turkish Cypriot constituent state and the Republic of Cyprus will be dissolved and divided into two states, of equal status.

In the Turkish Cypriot constituent state, based on the acquis of the talks, no Greek Cypriot will have the right to vote in national elections, while only 20% of those who return will have the right to vote in local elections.

The Turks, as we have analyzed in a previous article, will perceive the current pseudo-state as a separate state, as the citizen carries with him the right to vote and is identified with his homeland and the state. With citizenship. If there are three nationalities based on the acquis communautaire, one common and one for each state, the vote will come from the states. That is, there will be a separate sovereign right and a double source of sovereignty here as well. There will be two homelands.

Theirs and ours. If a Greek Cypriot lives in the North, he will not automatically have the right to vote. If he wants to have the right to vote, he must renounce his Greek Cypriot identity and citizenship and acquire Turkish Cypriot if approved by the Turkish Cypriot authorities. This is a return to Ottoman law. That is, in order to have a vote, you had to become from a Christian Greek to a Muslim Turk. The Turks want to apply this Ottoman Law to both the overall solution and the Famagusta formula.

So how do the Turks act? If they say, there will be no comprehensive solution because the Greek Cypriots will not accept the stay of a Turkish army even in the logic of a military base in the English model, then they will seek implementation of part of the solution, locally, in Famagusta, creating a complete, and imposing solution that they want. That is, they will allow the return of a number of Greek Cypriots under Turkish Cypriot administration, as they would return or return on the basis of the acquis of the talks.

That is, returning to the north without the right to vote and subjecting them to the laws of the pseudo-state, which will be recognized in case of a solution in an equal constituent Turkish Cypriot state. In fact, those who will return to the north either before or after the settlement wish to have the right to vote, will be able to contact the Occupying Authorities or the Authorities of the Turkish Cypriot constituent state. Such a development before the solution will not be convenient, because the passport and the identities of the pseudo-state will not be recognized internationally.

Dilemmas, ultimate betrayal, prevention

What we must avoid is the civil war, in which the Turks expect to involve us. And we explain: According to chapter 154 of the penal code of the Republic of Cyprus, issues arise concerning various offenses, even that of treason (see Article 34 et seq. 47 on actions against the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus).

One could argue that those who accept to be subject to the law and the Authorities of the pseudo-state, could be faced with a series of offenses as long as there is possession and illegal secession. However, someone else is wondering how to turn the legitimate state against the Famagusta people, who will want to return, under the illegal Turkish Cypriot administration, when:

A. Are the characteristics of Ankara's plan for Famagusta, as we have analyzed, part of the acquis of the talks? At this point one can claim that no agreement has been signed and there is no legitimate settlement regime. On the other hand, someone else will say: Is a Famagusta man immoral if he goes alone, but moral and legal if the President signs?

B. Not only have they not initiated criminal proceedings against the occupation leaders for various offenses, but we are obviously allowing them to travel internationally with passports of the Republic of Cyprus. Even if our leadership decides to remove the passports of those who return to Famagusta, shouldn't the same be done for the Turkish Cypriots who knowingly usurp Greek Cypriot property, as well as for the leadership of the occupied ones?

The agreed

And all this will happen on the basis of Turkish plans, while since 1979 there are clear agreements and decisions for Famagusta, which have remained a blank slate. On this we mention what has been decided between Kyprianou - Denktash, in the High Level Agreements of '79. Paragraph 5 states:

"Priority will be given to reaching an agreement on the resettlement of Greek Cypriot refugees in Varosia, under the auspices of the UN, as soon as the interlocutors begin examining the constitutional and territorial aspects of a comprehensive agreement. "Especially after reaching an agreement on Varosia, it will be implemented without expecting the result of the discussions on the other aspects of the Cyprus problem as well."

UN Security Council Resolution 550 states: "Considers (means SA) the attempts to colonize any part of Varos by individuals other than their inhabitants as unacceptable and calls for the transfer of that area to the United Nations."

Famagusta in exchange for recognition

After 2004 and the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU. The issue of isolation of the Turkish Cypriots was raised, following the inaction of the Cypriot Governments, which had not put the Cyprus issue on its proper footing as a problem of invasion and occupation. And they did not explain at length that the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots does not exist. And if there is, it is due to the occupation and to Turkey. Those who are really isolated from the exercise of their rights and the EU principles. are the Greek Cypriots and especially the refugees. In fact, the classic example was and should be the Famagusta people and the return of their city.

And if someone claims that our leaders said that, in practice they did something else. They tacitly adopted the Turkish position, which claimed that the issue of Famagusta would be settled with the solution. Or the Turks stressed, "if you want the enclosed city before the solution, then the port will open, but at the same time the illegal airport of Tympos will operate with the recognition of a separate FIR". That is, to recognize the pseudo-state instead of Turkey recognizing the Republic of Cyprus, as the September 21, 2005 statement states.

Enclosed city operation

The Turks, an issue in which we had the negotiating advantage, namely Famagusta, turn it into an Achilles heel, hoping to create conditions for moral and state dilemmas and civil strife between the Greek Cypriots. The backbone of Deryneia, which has not yet opened because the Turks do not accept the relocation of the outpost where Solomos Solomou was assassinated, can become a backdoor of their design. Residents of the area and professional organizations are reacting to the opening of the Deryneia roadblock for various reasons.

The Turks have decided to open the beach in Agios Memnon to tourists, while their next steps include the opening of other beaches and hotels currently used for the families of soldiers and students in the enclosed city. The hotels that are already operating are the following: GOLDEN PLAGE HOTEL, SANDY BEACH HOTEL, ASTERIAS HOTEL and ETOILE APPARTMENTS. MARINA HOTEL and ABBEY COURT HOTEL operate for the needs of the students of the illegal "university" in Famagusta.

The fenced area of ​​Varosia constitutes 16,75% of the total area of ​​the occupied Municipality of Famagusta and 0,0007% of the total area of ​​Cyprus. Surveillance of the area was assigned to UNFICYP Section 4 (HQ Sector 4), which maintains its headquarters in Famagusta at Camp General Stefanik. For this purpose, it has 1 detachment from the detachment based in Deryneia. Essentially, the surveillance of the closed area is carried out by a Slovak Squad based in Deryneia (in the dead zone). Their mission is carried out with the development of 3 to 5 observatories and on-board patrols on predetermined routes.

Concerns, economy, security

The Turks, as usual, seek to win over all scenarios. They are mining Famagusta under the shadow of solution formulas at the base of the two states. If the Turks want to entice the Famagustans to return under the administration of the pseudo-state, they will first open the besieged city and then invite them. If the trick does not work, because, among other things, the reconstruction needs a few billion euros, they will use the city themselves to create a completed one, in which the opening of the roadblock in Deryneia will help.

Issues of trade in gasoline, drugs, etc. are already being raised, while there will be a problem in the wider tourism industry, especially in restaurants and recreation areas. Thus, a political and economic-tourist issue is raised, as well as an issue of discrimination against the favored citizens of the Republic of Cyprus, who pay taxes and invest in the free zones.

In addition, there is another issue raised by locals as well as professional organizations. It's that of security. He even wondered if the Deryneia roadblock would be a healthy MOE or another backdoor to strengthen the occupation, as Ankara seeks to turn the Famagusta affair over due to long-standing strategic deficits of the Greek Cypriot political leadership.

Therefore, we must not fall into the trap of division or the Turkish minefield of Famagusta, or the logic of the two states, with or without constituent states, only what the EU should use. determines for the recognition of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey and for the immediate return of the city as MOE, as the resolutions of the SA determine. The return of Famagusta must be a prelude to the resumption of talks. When Ankara does not keep what has already been agreed, where is its good will for the future?

Source: TODAY Sunday