By Dr. Aspasia Aligizaki
In a frozen Europe, wintering on the one hand from the pandemic, on the other hand from the energy crisis and the consequent rise in prices, a new cold war is raging between Russia and the USA. A small "spark" in Ukraine is enough to turn it, suddenly, into heat. And the flames will undoubtedly touch Greece as well, especially as in this Russian-Ukrainian conflict our national adversary, Turkey, plays an important role.
It is well known that in recent years, Turkey and Ukraine have deepened their political, economic and military cooperation. As of 2021, Turkey is the largest foreign investor in Ukraine. The Ukrainian-Turkish cooperation concerns, among other things, major infrastructure projects, the supply of Turkish unmanned aircraft, the ordering of new Turkish-made corvettes, as well as the planning for a direct Turkish contribution to the production of Ukrainian aircraft.
Turkey, on the other hand, has been an important partner of Russia for years, being an essential transit point for Russian energy to Europe via the Turk Stream (and Turk Stream 2) pipeline. It is also one of the best customers in the energy market and in the S-400 missile defense systems and a key partner in the creation of a nuclear power plant on the Mediterranean coast by the Russian state company ROSATOM.
What will Turkey do in the event of a second Russian invasion of Ukraine?
If we look back, this will be more correctly the third Russian invasion, taking into account the invasion of Catherine the Great in 1783. A historical invasion, indicative of Russia's constant interest in the region, which, however, was then, and it is still at the heart of its neighbor's strategy as well as a pre-eternal hotbed of Russian-Turkish conflict.
Moscow-Ankara relations are, of course, very strong today, of strategic importance for both sides. But the resurgence by Russia of abandoned military installations in occupied Crimea and the relocation of modern weapons systems to it will undermine the wider security situation in the Black Sea. And this is clearly a problem for Turkey, which wants to keep the "key" to a safe, controlled Black Sea region through the implementation of the Montreux Convention.
Turkey, then, seems to be coming at Russia once again, as it has in the recent past with Syria, Libya and Nagorno. But given its severe economic and financial crisis, Turkey may ultimately be reluctant to meet any of its commitments to Ukraine, as Russia could retaliate with economic and trade sanctions. Turkey's trade with Russia, after all, is much higher than that with Ukraine.
How much can Moscow pull?
Ukraine, on the other hand, is for Russia a former Soviet Republic that the Kremlin always wants to have tied to its "chariot." The main reason is that Ukraine remains the most important transit route for gas to European markets. And the supply and transfer of energy resources to Europe is of major importance to the Russians. It is the "oxygen" for the Russian economy and, consequently, the Russian geopolitical power.
Russia almost monopolizes the gas trade in Europe and has a large share of the oil market. Europe, in particular, is dependent on the Russians, as it needs them for more than a third of its energy needs. In this context, a generalized Russian-Ukrainian crisis poses many dangers for Europe.
A possible Russian-Ukrainian rupture could lead the Old Continent to an icy and dark period of multiple interruptions in energy flows. In a blackout and a consequent humanitarian crisis, such as in 2006 and 2009, when Russia and Ukraine's gas price disputes resulted in the first shutting down the energy tap, leaving homes and χωρίς hospitals without heating. And in fact in a heavy winter, where the price of gas is, today, already much higher than a year ago.
The current energy (and Russian-Ukrainian) crisis is certainly not accidental. It is part of a coordinated Russian foreign policy effort for the European approval of Nord stream 2. A pipeline that will bring gas to Central Europe and Germany, bypassing Ukraine and degrading its role as a gas transit state, but at the same time perpetuate Europe's energy dependence on Moscow.
And what will the US do?
And, of course, the United States can not stoically watch Russia manipulate energy prices and ally Europe, using energy to strengthen its geopolitical role. They reasonably want to have Ukraine as their ally, joining NATO. And this irritates Russia, which does not want to have a potentially hostile state on its doorstep.
So, in our wider neighborhood, a scene reminiscent of the Cuban crisis of 1962. A crisis that almost led to a Third World War, as Russia brought ballistic missiles to Cuba on the doorstep of America in retaliation for America's missiles in Europe and Turkey. And then, as now, Turkey had its role. Notably, the crisis ended with Kennedy's commitment, among other things, to the removal of American missiles from Turkish territory.
Turkey, therefore, then, as now, is at the center of the conflict. And this concerns us. Especially since, as it seems, it is also related to the recent developments regarding EastMed. At a time when one of the main reasons for EastMed's design, Europe's independence from Russia, seems more inevitable than ever, Americans seem to be withdrawing their interest.
What could have happened to Eastmed?
On the one hand, EastMed may no longer be a profitable investment. The most expensive pipeline in Europe is in danger of being left unclaimed until it is implemented. Mainly due to Europe's direct orientation towards "clean" energy, the coverage of Europeans from other gas sources (such as the Shah Deniz Azeri field through the TANAP pipeline crossing Georgia and Turkey), Russia's long-term bilateral agreements and possibility of supplying liquefied natural gas.
But a key geopolitical reason for withdrawing US interest from EastMed may be the US desire to end the escalation of tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean so that Turkey can focus more on Ukraine and the vital Black Sea region.
The United States obviously has an interest in Turkey continuing its uninterrupted military support in Ukraine against Russia. In other words, they apply, in this case, the well-known successful strategy of Divide and Reign.
In any case, Turkey can hardly stay out of the conflict, and Erdogan, although until recently he seemed to be relatively successful between Russian and American aspirations, now he must try hard enough not to be caught in the flames. possible war rupture. And Greece? Fortunately, it seems to have long since abandoned its unfortunate policy of appeasement, strengthening its deterrent capacity with armaments and important alliances.
However, because with the possible death of EastMed, our country is in danger of weakening geopolitically (with Turkey, on the other hand, remaining due to the TANAP pipeline and Turk Stream, an important transit energy hub), it must be constantly vigilant. And it must definitely proceed in a coordinated manner with its electricity interconnection with Israel and Cyprus, via the EuroAsia Interconnector cable, as well as with Egypt via the EuroAfrica Interconnector cable.
Also, no one should worry that with the end of EastMed, Turkey will drop its tones in the SE Mediterranean. The laying of cables in areas where Turkey considers itself to be under its own maritime jurisdiction will undoubtedly raise issues again with the neighboring country.
For the foreseeable future, however, developments seem to be focusing mainly on the Russian-Ukrainian border.
It remains to be seen whether Tsar Nicholas's well-known aphoristic saying "Russia has two generals it can trust, January and February" will immediately take on a new, topical meaning in the context of the raging Moscow-Kiev crisis.
* Dr. Aspasia Aligizaki, Doctor of International & European Studies - Lawyer, Professor of Law Sorbonne Paris Nord / IdEF, Deputy Mayor of Piraeus